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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

15534

THEODORE ROBERT BUNDY,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted and sentenced and filed a brief
with this court in Case No. 14741.

Reply briefs were also filed.

Appellant filed a motion for a new trial or a Petition for Extraordinary Relief.

The motion was denied and this appeal is based

thereon, together with the direct appeal from the conviction set
furth in the above briefs.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After Appellant's conviction on March 1, 1976, a direct
appeal was taken to this court.

Briefs and reply briefs were filed

in Case No. 14741 by both parties and the matter was set for oral
argument.
~s

New evidence was discovered by Appellant.

This case

remanded to the District Court on Appellant's motion.

~tion

A

for a new trial or a Petition for Extraordinary Relief was

filed August 29, 1977.

On October 3, 1977, an off the record

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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meeting was held before the Honorable Stewart H. Hanson, Jr.,
the judge who presided at the trial.
Hanson, Jr., recused himself.

Two days later, Judge

(R.ll72)

On October 31, 1977,

a hearing was held before the Honorable Jay E. Banks.

The

motion was considered and evidence heard and the motion of
Appellant was denied on November 21, 1977.

From this ruling

Appellant takes this appeal to supplement the direct appeal as
stated above.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
In addition to the relief sought in Case No. 14741,
Appellant seeks the reversal of the order of the Court below
denying his bid for a new trial and a remand of the case for
a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant filed briefs on appeal and a reply brief from
his conviction and in this Court the matter was set for oral
argument in Case No. 14741.

Due to the discovery of certain
I

evidence Appellant moved to remand the cause to the Third Judicia:
District Court.

That motion was granted.

This was necessary so

the Court below could consider Appellant's ~otion for a New Trial
or Petition for Extraordinary Relief, and so the lower Court cou~
have the benefit of having the entire record before it in conside:j
Appellant's new evidence and his motions based thereon.

It was

also necessary so this Court could hear one appeal rather than
two separate appeals.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Hearings were held on Appellant's Motion and Petition
and the Court denied Appellant's Motion. (R.lOSO)
The facts of the case have been set forth to some
extent in Appellant's Brief in Case No. 14741, primarily
pages 2-11.

Additional facts were developed in the pleadings

and at the hearings on Appellant's Motion for a New Trial.

To

be in proper context Appellant will set them forth in detail in
this brief because the development of the facts of the case are
so crucial to an understanding of Appellant's claim.
On November 8, 1974, between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m., Carol
DaRonch was approached by a man while she was window-shopping
in the Fashion Place Mall, Hurray, Utah.

The man informed her

that someone had tried to break into her car, and he then requested
that she accompany him to her car to see if anything was missing.
The man, who was believed to have represented himself as a police
officer, walked with Ms. DaRonch to her automobile located in the
~!all

parking lot, whereupon she determined that nothing was

missing.

The man then requested that she come with him to sign

a complaint against the person who had allegedly broken into her
car.

Agreeing to do so, Xs. DaRonch then followed the man back

to and through the Mall, across another parking lot, across a
street and to a point on the sidewalk in front of a laundromat.
Until this point, DaRonch had had a couple of face to face con:rontations with the man, but spent most of the time walking behind
or beside him.

Although it was evening, there appeared to be ample

Htificial lighting along the course walked.
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At the laundromat, the man left her and approached the
building, indicating that it was a "substation", and then returned to her.

This action aroused her suspicion, causing her

b

to ask him for identification, which he produced in the form of
a badge contained in a wallet.

1

They then walked to the man s

which was parked at the curbside.
and the man the driver s side.
1

f

car

She entered the passenger side

He made a u- turn, drove for

p,

approximately one half mile, and pulled abruptly to a stop in

01

front of an elementary school.

h<

Not understanding this action,

tr

Ms. DaRonch indicated to him that this did not appear to be the
police station.

(R.386, 421, Exhibit 31-D)

Without responding

her, he grabbed her arm and put a handcuff on it.

ti'

sc

They struggled I de

briefly; she tried to open the car door; he produced what she

j

ha

described as a small revolver; he told her to stop struggling or

an

he would "blow her head off"; and pulling away from him after thi<

of

threat, she exited the car.

Once outside the vehicle, she found

that he had followed her out the passenger door.

He grabbed her

La]

with one hand and in the other hand, which he had raised above hi:' of
head, he had a metal object which DaRonch grabbed in the belief
was going to hit her with it.

r)

Quickly, she broke loose of his

and, with the handcuffs still dangling from her arm, ran into the

hi~

Apr

boc

street where she encountered an automobile, flagged it down, and,: For
in a somewhat hysterical state of mind, jumped into the vehicle.

abd

Neither the occupants of the car into which DaRonch fled nor DaRo:: car
saw anything more of her assailant or his car.
immediately to the Murray Police Department.

She was taken
(R.l56-157)
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tim

'and

In her testimony at trial, DaRonch did not venture an
estimate as to the length of time she had been with her abductor,
but the State stipulated to a re-enactment which showed the
period she was with the man to have been from between ten and

u

fifteen minutes.
Over nine months later, on August 16, 1975, Utah Highway

le

Patrol Sergeant Robert Hayward pulled over a beige 1968 Volkswagen,
o~ed

and operated at the time by Appellant.

Officer Hayward

had stopped the vehicle in Granger, Utah, for failing to stop at
the command of a police officer.

A search of this vehicle at the

t

scene by Hayward and several Salt Lake County Sheriff s Office

~~!

deputies revealed, among other things, a crowbar and a pair of

1

handcuffs.

These items were seized and Appellant was arrested

and booked in the county jail for failing to stop at the command

1:

of Hayward.
On August 21, 1975, Appellant was re-arrested at his Salt
Lake City apartment pursuant to a warrant issued for the offense

1::
h:
JC

of possession of burglary tools.

It was the items seized from

his car on August 16, 1975, which constituted the alleged tools.
Appellant was taken to the Salt Lake County Jail, where he was

Je: booked, and shortly thereafter, interrogated by a Detective Ben
l,

Forbes regarding several matters, including the November 8, 1974,
abduction of Carol DaRonch.

~

1

According to Forbes, Appellant s

cu resembled the one used in the DaRonch abduction.

At this

:ime. Appellant's signature was obtained on a consent form, and
md later that afternoon his apartment was searched in his presence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by three Salt Lake County detectives.

Following the search,

Detective Jerry Thompson received Appellant's permission to
take and did take several polaroid pictures of Appellant's
automobile.
Eleven months after the kidnapping, on October 2, 1975,
Appellant was ordered to appear in a line-up.

At the line-up,

Ms. DaRonch made a positive identification of Appellant.

He was

immediately placed under arrest, and charged with aggravated
kidnapping in violation of Utah Code Ann., Section 76-5-302
(Supp. 1975).
held in the

(R.863)

T~:c:::i

On February 22, 1976, a bench trial was

!·~.::.;..cia:.

District Court in and for Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.,
presiding.

The prosecution was based on the eyewitness identi-

fication testimony of DaRonch.

There was no physical evidence

or other identification testimony to corroborate the DaRonch
identification.

Circumstantial evidence presented was remote,

if not improbative.

Appellant was convicted on March 1, 1976,

and was sentenced to an indeterminant term of between one and
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison on June 30, 1976.
According to police reports released to Appellant's couns'
prior to his trial, the first reported action taken in regard
to Appellant as a suspect in the DaRonch matter, after the
August 21, 1975, search of his apartment, occurred on September
1975.

A police report by Detective Jerry Thompson indicated tha:

on September 1, he met with Ms. DaRonch at her place of work an~
showed to her the polaroid pictures of Appellant's car. after
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which he showed her a photographic array of between twenty and
thirty pictures, one of which being a mug shot taken of Appellant
during his booking on August 16, 1975.

(R.432,435)

Thompson's

September 1 report will be analyzed in depth later, but in essence,
,

it alleges that DaRonch made a tentative identification of Appellant.
Further, it said that DeRonch expressed an opinion that she would

1as

be able and willing to identify her kidnapper in person at a
physical lineup.
Next, according to pretrial discovery material, DaRonch
was shown another photographic array containing a driver's license
~hoto

of Appellant taken in December, 1974.

Again, DaRonch pur-

' portedly made a "looks like" identification according to a
Bountiful City Police Department report of September 4, 1975.
, The reports then reveal that on September 8, 1975, DaRonch was
taken to the address where Appeallant resided and there viewed
his car.

The report in question stated that DaRonch indicated

"this looks like the car ... ".

(R.504, 875, 843)

The only other contact with the victim, admitted to by
?olice which occurred prior to the October 2 lineup, occurred
on or about September 30, 1975.

At this time, DaRonch was taken

to the University of Utah College of Law to view Appellant, but
~was

not there that day.

The four contacts described above

11ere confirmed both by discovery material and pretrial hearing
a:

and trial testimony.

(R. 568, 864-865)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-7-administered by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In preparing for pretrial hearings and trial, Appellant's
counsel relied heavily on the statements and representations contained in the police reports mentioned above, which dealt with
critical pre-lineup contacts made with DaRonch by police.
In January, 1977, Appellant was extradited to Pitkin Coun:
Colorado, to face a murder charge.

In April, 1977, he success-

fully applied to the Colorado court to permit him to proceed with·
out counsel.

During that same month, he filed extensive discover

motions, including motions directly related to the DaRonch kidnapping case because the Colorado prosecuting authorities had
indicated that thev would attempt to use such evidence as a
"similar transaction" to the Colorado offense.

In response to

a court order on the discovery motions, a meeting was held in
Glenwood Springs, Colorado, on

~ay

24, 1977, between Milton K.

Blakey, a special prosecutor with the Pitkin County District
Attorney's Office; Michael Fisher, an investigator for the
District Attorney's Office; and the defendant, prose.
pose of the meeting was for the prosecutor to release to

The purAppell~:

all court ordered or otherwise discoverable material in his files
(R. 989-991, 1005-1007)
During the course of the discovery session,

~ichael

Fishe:.

gave Appellant a nine page document which Fisher said had been
sent to him by Detective Jerry Thompson.
document reads:

The first line of the

"The below report is being compiled by Detective

Jerry Thompson, Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, on 9-10-75."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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..

t 's

The disclosure of this document has been noted in reports on that

on·

discovery session filed by Mr. Blakey and Appellant with the
Clerk of the Pitkin County District Court, the same document
having been heretofore filed in this case.

(R. 992-996)

The nine page document disclosed in Colorado is actually

)Unc

two reports:

one four page report followed by a five page report.

lth·

The second five page report begins with a description of Thompson's

1€[':

search of Appellant's apartment on August 21, 1975, and continues
·.-ith activities occurring on August 22, 1975, which includes
Thompson's showing to DaRonch pictures of Appellant and Appellant's
automobile.

This second Thompson report (R.984) shall be referred

to throughout this brief as the "suppressed report".
A reading of this report shows that it contains a number
of very exculpatory statements which go directly to the reliability
of DaRonch as an eyewitness, which directly contradict a Thompson
report on this same incident

(September 1, 1975) released to

Appellant's counsel prior to the DaRonch kidnapping trial, and

.an:, ·.-hich had never been made known to Appellant or his defense counsel

.es

?rior to or during the kidnapping trial.
In December, 1975, the Salt Lake County prosecutor gave

he:

ve

defense counsel a Thompson report typed on a "Follow-up Report"
:arm.

(R.983)

~eport

shall be r~:ferred to throughout this brief as the "released

report".

The report was dated September 1, 1975.

This

The relevant portion of that report reads:

-9-
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"She went through the stack of pictures
and pulled Mr. Bundy's picture out, handed me
the stack back and stated, 'I don't see anyone
in there'.
I then asked her what the one was
doing in her hand.
She stated, 'Oh, I forgot
this', and handed it back to me.
She was
questioned as to why she pulled it out.
She
stated, 'I don't know, it looks something like
him.
I really don't know, I can't be sure, but
it does look a lot like him'.
She was asked
at this time if she would be willin , if we ot
a ineup set up, to view t e in ivi ua in
person.
She stated that she would be more
than willing to and that if she saw the individual in erson she felt rather confident that
she cou
identi y him.
~Emphasis a ded.
Thompson's repcr-t c;iven to defendant on May 24, 1977,
referred to as the suppressed report, reads in part as follows:
" ... In going through the pictures, she pulled
out Hr. Bundy's picture in her hand, gave the pictures
back to this officer, stating, 'I don't see anyone
in there that resembles him'.
She was asked what
the one was doing in her hand.
She stated, 'Oh,
here'.
I asked her if that was the guy or why she
pulled it out.
She stated, 'I don't know, aah, I
guess it looks something like him'.
She was asked
if she was afraid to identify him, and she stated
no.
She said, 'That looked maybe somethin9 like
him, she really tust didn't know, she didn t think
she could identi y him if she saw him again or
not. This is aver
oor witness in this detective's
I on t know i
she can identi v the
she is scare or what the situation
date, communication is still going
on with several other agencies by this detective
and Detective Forbes. They are attempting to come
up with a lineup on this individual through Bountiful and possibly some other state's witnesses
coming in.
It has not been set up yet."
(Emphasis
added.)
The suppressed version of Thompson's report gives
the distinct impression that DaRonch did not identify Appellant
("she really just didn't know"), and that in addition, she
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
-10-

expressed her doubt that she would be able to identify her abductor
again i f she did see him.

This is a far cry from the "official"

version which has DaRonch expressing confidence about identifying
the man in person at a lineup.

In fact, Thompson makes no request

whatsoever that DaRonch attend a lineup in the suppressed report.
In the released version, Appellant comes off looking "a lot like"
the abductor, while in the suppressed version he "looked maybe
something like him" but "she really just didn't know".
Equally as devastating is the revelation in the suppressed
report that, "This is a very poor witness in this detective's opinion
and I don't know if she can identify the individual or if she is
scared or what the situation is".
statement are far-reaching.

The implications of this

Thompson, a veteran investigator,

calls DaRonch a "very poor witness".

He then expressed doubt

that she had made any kind of identification of the accused
("I don't know if she can identify the individual ... ").
There is an obvious problem.

The suppressed report depicts

, a witness who is confused to the point that no one knows if she
has or if she can make an identification.

The released report's

assertion that she "felt rather confident she could identify him"
in a lineup is patently absurd and false.

It is now apparent why

no lineup was held until over a month after this first photo
display:
I

DaRonch was a poor witness who had failed to pick the

suspect's picture.
-11-
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The suppressed report closes with Thompson looking for a
way to "come up with a lineup on this individual" through
witnesses in other jurisdictions.

His opinion that DaRonch is

a "very poor witness" is emphasized even further by his rejection
of using DaRonch in a lineup.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BOTH THE SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY HAD A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
DETECTIVE THOMPSON'S SUPPRESSED REPORT.
Detective Jerry Thompson testified at the trial that
'

t

the first time Carol DaRonch was approached regarding Theodore
Bundy was on September l, 1975, and that was the only time that
he had shown her photographs.

He testified that he gave her

a packet of 27 photographs of different individuals, one of
which was a photograph of Appellant, Theodore Bundy; that she
t

looked through the packet to determine if any of the men depictec

f,

resembled the man who had abducted her; that in looking through
the packet she removed the photograph of Theodore Bundy, looked
through the rest of the stack and returned it to the witness

J:

with the co=en t:

"I don't see anyone in here"; that he then

t!

asked her, "how about the photograph that was in her hand," and
she replied:

"Oh this one, I don't know.

Here", and handed it

to the witness; that the witness "then asked her why she pulled
that photograph out, if there was something significant about it
and that Carol DaRonch then said:

"V
.es, I believe that looks
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library
Services
and
Technology
Act,
administered
by the Utah State Library.
lot like the individual
but I'm not sure.
(R :.97, 975. l006)
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a

I
'

:c

m

Jerry Thompson further testified that he gave another
?hotograph of Appellant to officers of the Bountiful Police to
show to Carol DaRonch.

Detective Ira Beal testified that on

September 4, 1975, he showed to Carol DaRonch a packet of eight
pictures, containing a photograph of Appellant, but no other
photograph that she had seen before and, particularly, no
photographs of the four other individuals she had previously
picked as looking like her abductor.

(R.

525-529, 975, 1066)

Carol DaRonch testified that she did not recall what
she said to Detective Thompson on September 1, 1975, in regard
to Appellant's photograph and had even a hazier recollection
regarding the photograph shown to her by Detective Beal on
September 4, 1975.

(R. 974, 1006)

On December 19, 1975, the defendant filed a Motion
for Order Requiring Disclosure that requested, among other things,
that the court order the County Attorney's Office "to produce
:or inspection all written reports in the possession of the State
concerning the investigation of this case" and "to disclose to
the defendant any and all evidence which is or may be favorable
or exculpatory to the defendant .

. including reports concerning

the viewing of photographs by Carol DaRonche (sic) and . . . any
occasions Carol DaRonche (sic) was shown photographs of defendant
"nd either made no identification or failed to make a certain

identification."

At a hearing on this motion on December 12,

:975, before the Honorable Peter Leary, the prosecuting attorney
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

agreed to provide defense counsel with the reports regarding
the two times Carol DaRonch had been shown the defendant's
photographs according to the police officers and the court
ordered him to do so.

(R. 976, 1006)

On January 15, 1976, defendant's Motion for Disclosure
came on for further hearing before the Honorable Peter Leary.
At that time the prosecuting attorney, David Yocom, agreed to

I
I

furnish the reports requested in the motion which were in his
possession and the court so ordered.

Defense counsel expressed

I
I c
I

his concern that the Sheriff's Office may have a report pertaining

1

to this incident which tends to be exculpatory to this defendant
and which they may withhold from the County Attorney and therefore
requested the court to make the order directly applicable to law
enforcement agencies.

T

David Yocom represented to the court that

he had examined the entire records of the Salt Lake County SherWI

0

Office and that, "I know what is contained in that record relating

t:

to this particular offense and I can represent to the court that

t]

I have everything in that record pertaining to this particular
i

offense."

The court, expressly relying upon Mr. Yocom's represenc, il

tion, declined to extend the order to directly apply to the Salt

St

Lake County Sheriff.

S<

(R. 976, 991, 1006)

ic

On January 15, 1976, the prosecution filed a written
Reply to Defendant's Motion for Disclosure, over the signature
o f t h e County Attorney by David Yocom, which stated that the
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!

Ja

reports concerning the viewing of photographs by Carol DaRonch
had been previously submitted to counsel for the defendant.
(R.

977. 1006)
On February 17, 1976, the Honroable Stewart M. Hanson,

Jr. issued an order directed to the Sheriff of Salt Lake County
and Captain N.D. Hayward, among others, directing them to
' forthwith deliver to David Yocom copies of all reports, memoranda,
and correspondence pertaining, in any way, to the investigation
of the abduction of Carol DaRonch.

(R.82)

The only report concerning the September l, 1975 viewing

ing

t

of photographs by Carol DaRonch furnished to counsel for the

ore

defense was a document purporting to be a "Follow-up Report''.

w

dated September l, 1975, with the typed "signature" of Jerry
Thompson.

This report conformed substantially with the testimony

I

if:· of Jerry Thompson at the trial, and is referred to hereafter as
the "disclosed report."

in[

(R. 983, 977, 1007)

This report, in

addition to the matters discussed in paragraph 3, supra, contained
:he statement:

i:

en::

"She was asked at this time if she would be willing.

we got a line-up set up, to view the individual in person.

She stated she would be more than willing to and that if she
saw the individual in person felt rather confident that she could
identify him."
At a hearing on defendant's
1

~otion

to Suppress, held on

January 21, 1976, before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.

-15- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Jerry Thompson testified, under oath, that the Disclosed Report
reflected what Carol DaRonch did and said during the viewing of
photographs on September 1, 1975, as best he could recall.
(R.977, 978, 1007)
On May 24, 1977, Michael Fisher, an investigator for the
Pitkin County, Colorado, District Attorney's Office, in the
presence of Milton K. Blakey, Deputy District Attorney for Pitkin
I

County, handed to Theodore Bundy a report which Michael Fisher

t

stated he had received from Jerry Thompson of the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's

Ofi~ce.

This report also describes, among other

things, the viewing of photographs, including a photograph of
Theodore Bundy, by Carol DaRonch at the request of Jerry Thompson
The suppressed report and the disclosed report, although
written by the same detective and described the same incident
differ in the following significant particulars:
(a)

The disclosed report states that Carol DaRonch in-

formed Detective Thompson that "if she saw the individual in
person she felt rather confident that she could identify him,"
while the suppressed report states, "she didn't think she could

v

identify him if she saw him again or not."
(b)

In the disclosed report and in his testimony,

Detective Thompson indicated that after Miss DaRonch said that
she did not see anyone in the packet of pictures, that he asked
her, in neutral language, why she had pulled Mr. Bundy's picture
-16-
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out and she replied, "I don't know, I can't be sure, but it looks
something like him.

I really don't know, I can't be sure, but

it does look a lot like him."

Whereas, the suppressed report

states that Detective Thompson asked the suggestive question
"if that was the guy or why she pulled it out" and she replied,
"I don't know, aah, I guess it looks something like him."

The

suppressed report then indicates that Detective Thompson asked

.r.

' the additional highly suggestive and challenging question, if
she was afraid to identify Mr. Bundy, which she denied and then
conceded "that looked maybe something like him."
(c)
1

The disclosed report does not reflect Detective

Thompson's opinion that Carol DaRonch was "a very poor witness"

ml as does

t~e

(d)

suppressed report.
The whole tone of the disclosed report indicates

a fair viewing process conducted by an objective detective who

obtained a tentative identification which called for further
efforts to determine if the victim could actually make an
identification.

Whereas, the suppressed report reflects the

frustration of a detective who attempted and failed to get the
victim to make an identification of a person he regarded as
guilty and dangerous and indicates that those attitudes were
conveyed to the victim.
Had the suppressed report been disclosed to the defense,
?ursuant to the orders of the court and the State's duty to

-17-
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divulge exculpatory evidence, it would have been of great value
to the defense in the cross-examination of Carol DaRonch and
Jerry Thompson and in establishing the defense theory that
Carol DaRonch was initially unable to identify the defendant
but was induced to do so by police officers who, by repeatedly
showing Appellant's photograph, taking her in attempts to view
the defendant and his automobile, inducing her to positively
identify his automobile, even though she testified that it
"looked completelv different" and identified it because "it was
supposed to be ':he ca:::-." and generally convincing her that Appell1·
was the man who had kidnapped her and she was supposed to identif:
him.
The failure to disclose the suppressed report, the concealment of its existence by representations made to the court
by the prosecutor, the delivery of the disclosed report and the
testimony of Jerry Thompson that it accurately described the
initial viewing, and the testimony of Jerry Thompson describing
the initial viewing, all constituted a fraud upon the court and
the defense and severely hampered the truth-finding process pertaining to the most critical issue at trial.
The foregoing described acts and omissions of the State
effectively denied defendant his right to confront witnesses and
his right to due process of law in violation of Sections 7 and l2
Article I of the Constitution of Utah and the 6th and 14th Arnendl::e:.
to the Constitution of the United States.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This Court in State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975),
announced the rule governing nondisclosure of evidence favorable
and material to criminal defendants:
" ... (S)uppression or destruction of evidence
by those charged with prosecution, including police
officers, constitutes a denial of due process if
the evidence is material to guilt or innocence of
the defendant in a criminal case ... "
!!._, at 478.

The rule in Stewart is even broader in scope than that
of the leading United States Supreme Court case in the field of

la-

suppression of evidence, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
in which the Court said:
"We now hold that the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution."
I!_, 373 U.S. at 87.
Stewart's extension of the duty to disclose to police
officers has also been approved by the United States Supreme
Court in its opinion in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
(1972):

"Moreover, whether the nondisclosure was
a result of negligence or design, it is the
responsibility of the prosecutor. The prosecutor's
office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman
for the Government."
~-

405 U.S. at 154.

If the police were not burdened with a duty

:o disclose, the prosecutor could successfully claim that police
-19-
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officers, who did the principle investigation of a case, had
withheld exculpatory information from him, and, therefore,
that he had no duty to disclose the material.

This would leave

the defendant with no assertable claim when his right to a fair
trial had been clearly abridged.

To impede due process disclosure

in this fashion would effectively abrogate the fundamental fairness objectives sought by the many constitutional decisions
requiring disclosure of favorable and material evidence to the
defendant.

For this reason,

The police are also part of the
prosecution, and the taint on the trial is
no less if they, rather than the State's
Attorney, were guilty of nondisclosure.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"The duty to disclose is that of the
state, which ordinarily acts through the
prosecuting attorney; but if he too is the
victim of police suppression of the material
information, the state's failure is not on
that account excused. We cannot condone an
attempt to connect the defendant with the
crime by questionable inferences which
might be refuted by undisclosed and unproduced documents in the hands of the police."
Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964).

b~

In the instant case, not only did the prosecutor and othe:
agencies investigating the offense charged have a constitutional
due process duty to divulge information favorable and material
to the defense, but the trial judge had also imposed a strict
order, directing that exculpatory material be disclosed to the
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(l

defense.

On February 17, 1976, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson,

Jr., of the Third Judicial District Court, conducted a pretrial

conference attended by David Yocom, Deputy Salt Lake County
Attorney prosecuting the case, and John D. O'Connell and Bruce
Lubeck, counsel for the defendant.

A transcript of that pro-

ceeding shows that Judge Hanson issued the following oral
discovery order:
"I think the discussion Friday ended on that
note that I was convinced in my own mind that the
law not only is that the Prosecutor has a duty to
turn over any exculpatory materials to the Defense
upon request, that extends not only to anything
in his possession but anything in the possession
of anyone else. And I think that is the law.
And the gist of what I was saying Friday was that
anything that relates to Miss DaRonch in any way
from any agency should be turned over to Mr.
Yocom so he can review it to make a determination
whether there are in fact any exculpatory materials
which he has a duty to give over to the Defense
in this matter." (tr. at 5-6).
Due process imposes certain obligations on law enforcement
and investigatory agencies to insure every criminal trial is a
"search for the truth, not an adversary game."
v. Perry, 471 F.2d 1057, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

United States
The principle

behind establishing such a burden on the State "is not the
?unishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but
avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused."
supra., 373 U.S. at 87.

Brady v. Maryland,

In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,

(1976), the Supreme Court underscores this point by stating that
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the constitutional obligation is measured not "by the moral
culpability or the willfulness of the prosecutor" and that i f
constitutional error has occurred "it is because of the character
of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor."
L.Ed.2d at 353.

Id., 49

Therefore,

" ... When the prosecutor receives a specific
and relevant request, the failure to make any
response is seldom, if ever, excused."
~.

49 L.Ed.2d at 351.
In the present case, it is clear that the prosecutor and

the investigating agencies had an unmistakable duty to disclose
to Appellant exculpatory information, including the suppressed
police report in question.

The law, the trial court's order on

discovery, and defense counsel's specific and repeated requests
for such information all created that duty.

Failure to release

the suppressed report, which gives an exculpatory version of the
victim's first viewing of defendant's picture, is totally inexcus·
able.
POINT II
THE SUPPRESSED POLICE REPORT IS FAVORABLE AND MATERIAL
BECAUSE IT EFFECTIVELY DISCREDITS THE RELIABILITY OF
THE STATE'S SOLE EYEWITNESS TO THE CRIME. THIS IS
PARTICULARLY TRUE GIVEN THE OVERALL WEAK.~ESS OF THE
STATE'S CASE.
In United States v. Agurs, supra. , the Supreme Court not<
that newly discovered evidence in the possession of the prosecute
places it in a "different category than if it had simply been

-22-
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discovered from a neutral source after trial."
354.

Id. , 49 L. Ed2d at

The defendant seeking a new trial because the State withheld

:ter

evidence material and favorable to him "should not have to satisfy

f9

the severe burden of demonstrating that newly discovered evidence
probably would have resulted in acquittal."
354.

Id., 49 L.Ed.2d at

This must be the rule because:
" ... If the new standard applied to the
usual motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence were the same when the
evidence was in the State's possession as when
it was found in a neutral source, there would
be no special significance to the prosecutor's
obligation to serve the cause of justice."

md

:e
~.

49 L.Ed.2d at 354.

There can be no question in the present case that the State
.s

suppressed evidence.

e

the motivation for failing to disclose the report, both the police

he

and the prosecutor had a duty to disclose it.

cus·

to determine to what degree Appellant was prejudiced by the
nondisclosure.

It has also been shown that regardless of

Now it is necessary

Is the report in question material enough and

exculpatory enough to warrant the finding of constitutional error?
In Barbee v. Harden, supra. , a formula for showing prejudice is
outlined:

ot<
utc

"How strong a showing is required in a
given case will depend on the nature of the
charge, the testimony of the state, and the
role the undisclosed testimony would likely
have played."

!i:._, at 847.

-23-
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1.
Played.

The Role the Undisclosed Testimony Would Likely Have

A substantial issue in any trial may be the credibility

of prosecution witness because "(t)he jury's estimate of the
truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be
determinative of guilt or innocence ... "
360 U.S. 264, 269, (1959).

Napue v. Illinois,

In Giglio v. United States, supra.,

the government's case depended almost entirely on a co-conspirator
named Taliento.

The government failed to reveal that Taliento

had been promised immunity in return for his testimony.

Commenti~;

on how the importance of this witness influenced the trial, the
Supreme Court said·
":tere tne Government's case depended
entire:y on Taliento's testimony, without it
there could have been no indictment and no
evidence to carry the case to the jury.
Taliento's credibility as a witness was
therefore an important issue in the case,
... and the jury was entitled to know it."
~.

405 U.S. at 154-155.

In Giglio, the Court decided that

ID

v

"when the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative
of guilt or innocence", then suppression of evidence of this kind
warrants a new trial.

Id., 405 U.S. at 154.

The issue of reliability takes on added significance in
cases based on eyewitness identification.

The suppressed report

of Detective Thompson goes directly to the reliability of Carol
DaRonch, the victim and sole eyewitness to the crime with which
Appellant was charged.

ti

Without DaRonch's testimony, as without

Taliento's, there could have been no charge filed against
Appellant
and no evidence sufficient to support a conviction.
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e

According to the suppressed report, after she vie'I-Jed Appellant's

y

?icture closely, "She said, 'That looked maybe something like
him', she really just didn't know, she didn't think she could
identify him (her abductor) if she saw him again or not."
~othing

Ms. DaRonch could ever have said could have affected the

reliability of her alleged identification of the defendant more

Ltor

profoundly.

Suppression of this evidence requires the same result

as found in Giglio:

Reversal and a new trial.

Eyewitness identification cases are particularly affected

.tir.;

by suppression of evidence because the suppression thwarts effective

cross-examination which might reveal mis-identification.

A case

in point can be found in Norris v. Slayton, 450 F.2d 1241 (4th
Cir. 1976).
minutes.

A rape victim was held by her assailant for forty-five

About thirty minutes after the man left the victim's

house, the defendant was apprehended by police in the area of the
victim's home, taken back to her for identification, and identified
ive

by her attacker.

The defendant was convicted of rape solely on

nd

the testimony of the victim.
The police officer, who apprehended the defendant and was
?resent at the time the victim identified him, wrote a report
·vhich said:
"I took him to Mrs. McDaniel's house, who
met us at the back porch screen door and the
first thing she said was 'that is the man'. I
said, 'Mrs. McDan~els are you sure?', and she
hesitated and said,
'I know that is the man but
cannot swear to it'.''

-25-
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~.

at 1244.

The prosecutor was aware of this report but

Norris' defense counsel were not furnished with a copy.

Asses-

sing the materiality of the new evidence in light of the importanc
of the witness' testimony, the Court in Norris said:
" ... The primary issue before the jury
was the identification of the petitioner ...
This evidence was of crucial value to the
defense in cross-examining both Officer
Leake and t1rs. McDaniels on her identification of Norris, especially in view of
her equivocation at the preliminary hearing.
It was evidence which had a direct bearing
upon the critical issue in the case and might
'reasonabl~ have weakened or overcome testimonv a::ve:-se to the defendant. • Barbee,
supra .. at 847."
~.

at 1244.

Id

re:

of
of

The Norris court finally held that the recent decision of
United States v. Agurs, supra., did not require a different
result, since the suppressed report "was of such a nature to
raise a substantial likelihood that it would have affected the
result in Norris' trial."

Id., at 1244.

idE

idE

thE

thE

Courts are particularly apt to set aside convictions
based on the eyewitness identification testimony if only one
person is involved and the State has suppressed evidence tending
to reduce the reliability of that identification.

pol

In Austin v.

Wyrick, 535 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1976), the petitioner was convicte:

cau

cep

'wit

eff
of

solely on the eyewitness testimony of the victim who had given
inconsistant and conflicting statements regarding the identity o:
his assailant.

These statements were contained in police reports

not disclosed to defense counsel.

The Circuit Court said·
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magis-

an

li:_, at 445.

In Norris, Austin, and the present case, the prosecutions
relied heavily, if not exclusively, upon the victims' identification
of the accused.
' of the incident.

,f

Each case involved a single, eyewitness/victim
In all these cases, the State withheld a

police report wherein the victim expressed doubt about her
identification of the accused.

In Norris, for example, the

identification of the accused was far stronger than the one in
the present case, but the court's concern about the impact of
the suppressed evidence on the reliability of the identification
caused it to reverse the case.

Suppression of Detective Thompson's

:eport, a report Hhich casts much doubt on the ability of the
~itness

to identify Appellant or her abductor, denied Appellant

effective cross-examination of the Hitness on the critical issue
e:

of reliability, and violated his right to due process.
2.

The Nature of the Charge.

A second factor to be

considered when assessing materiality of suppressed evidence, is the

-27-
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nature of eyewitness testimony and the danger inherent therein.
The present case involved the showing to the victim a picture of
defendant on two occasions prior to her alleged identification
of Appellant at the lineup.

She testified at trial that she

could have picked Appellant from the lineup based on having seen
his pictures alone and that Appellant was the only one in the
lineup who looked like his pictures.

(R. 446)

She also testifiec

that she identified Appellant automobile, even though it looked
"completely different". because she had been led to believe that
it was the same car she had seen in some pictures.

(R.441)

She

testified that she associated the car she had "identified" with
the pictures she had seen of Appellant.

All this occurred prior

to the lineup where she identified Appellant.

The United States

Supreme Court spoke of the dangers of this kind of situation when
it wrote:
"It must be recognized that improper
employment of photographs may sometimes
cause witnesses to err in identifying
criminals .... This danger is increased if
the police display to the witness ... the
pictures of several persons among which
the photograph of a single such individual recurs or is in some way emphasized.
~he chance of misidentification is heightened
1f the police indicate they have other
evidence that one of the persons pictured
committed the crime. Regardless of how
the initial misidentification comes about,
the witness thereafter is apt to retain in
his memory theimage of the photograph
rather than the person actually seen, red~cing the trustworthiness of subsequent
l1neup or courtroom identification."
-k
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" ... The danger that use of the
technique may result in convictions based
on misidentification may be substantially
lessened by a course of cross-examination
at trial which exposes to the jury the
method's potential for error."
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-384, 19 L.Ed. 2d
1247, 88 S. Ct. 967 (1968).

.ec

Cross-examination, then, is the means by which errors
imbedded in critical identification testimony are exposed.

In

Norris v. Slayton, supra., Austin v. Wyrick, supra., and the

:t

present case, the suppression of the police reports regarding
witness uncertainty and confusion in identifying the accused
significantly decreased the defense's ability to explore, through
cross-examination, the crucial issue:

Reliability.

The suppres-

sed evidence in this case is material in part due to obvious
en

potential for misidentification established by Ms. DaRonch's
testimony.

The Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, 388

U.S. 218, (1967), warned:
" ... The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of
criminal law are rife with instances of
mistaken identification ... A major factor
contributing to the high incidence of miscarriages of justice from mistaken identification has been from the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the
prosecution presents the suspect to the
witnesses for pretrial identification."
Id., 388 U.S. at 228-229.

*

*

"Insofar as the accused conviction may
rest on a courtroom identification in fact
the fruit of a suspect pretrial identification
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which the accused is helpless to subject to
effective scrutiny at trial, the accused is
deprived of that right of cross-examination
which is an essential safeguard to confront
witnesses against him."
~.

388 U.S. at 235.
United States v. Wade stands for the extension of a

defendant's right to counsel in a post-indictment lineup.

It is

not Appellant's contention that the suppression of evidence in
this case is covered by Wade, since the notion that an attorney
should represent a suspect at a pretrial photographic display
has thus far been rejected as unworkable.

The point to be

illustrated, however. is that out-ot-court photographic lineups
monetheless are subject to the same dangers as post-indictment,
corporeal lineups, and that the goals of fairness and confrontation enunciated in Wade and Simmons should be considered when
evaluating the materiality of evidence which relates to pretrial
identification, and which has been suppressed by the State.
The conclusion based on this approach is that the suppresr
of the Thompson report of a photographic display shown to the so:
eyewitness and victim, Carol DaRonch, thwarted Appellant's
ability to fully and fairly expose through cross-examination the
critical issue of reliability, and that his inability to do so
may well have been dispositive of the guilty verdict against him
3.

The Testimony of the State.

A third factor to be

sidered when assessing the materiality of the new evidence is
-30-
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the overall weakness of the testimony adduced at trial which
purported to inculpate the defendant.
Point I.

See Appellant's Brief,

The lack of a strong case against the accused in

Austin v. Wyrick, supra., was certainly a factor in reversing
that case, since the court there noted the "thin" evidence in
the Austin case.

On reviewing the suppressed evidence here

in the context of the entire record, "if the verdict is already
of questional validity, additional evidence of relatively minor
importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt."
United States v. Agurs, supra., 49 L.Ed.2d at 355.

The weakness

of the case against Appellant shall be briefly analyzed, as in
Appellant's Brief, Point I, and the evidence shall be divided into
two categories:

Identification and circumstantial.

The identification testimony of Carol DaRonch grew out
of her identification of Appellant in a lineup held eleven months
after her abduction, during which she had been with her abductor
from between ten and fifteen minutes.

She identified Appellant

at the lineup on the basis first of his walk (R. 412-413), although she had never told police officers there was anything
distinctive about her abductor's walk.

She also picked Appellant

at the lineup because of his face (R.413), although she said
there was nothing distinctive about his face in particular
(R.

413), and her memory of her abductor's face was so vague

that she first said he had a mustache, then decided a few days
later that he did not, then finally felt that he did.

(R. 427,
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428, 489, 491).

Appellant did not have a mustache at the

nor did he have one at the time of the kidnapping.

line~

The victim

testified that she could have recognized Appellant from seeing
his pictures alone, and that nobody else in the lineup looked
like Appellant's picture.

(R. 446)

Nothing else about Appella'

at the lineup reminded DaRonch of her abductor, although she
did think Appellant looked different from her abductor because
Appellant was shorter and more clean cut.
posi::::..ve -:-:

~er

(R. 412)

She was

:.dentification of Appellant at the lineup and

in court, but as the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Wa:
supra., "(i)t is a matter of connon experience that once a witr.i
has picked out the accused at the (pretrial confrontation), he.
not likely to go back on his word later on."

388 U.S. at 229.

Da Rench's alleged identification of Appellant's car is
equally troublesome.

She described her abductor's car on the

night of her abduction as light blue or white, with lots of
rust spots and dents and a rip on the top of the right side of
the rear seat.

(R. 471, 478)

She did not change her descripti

of that automobile until after seeing three pictures of Appella:'
car shown her over nine months later.

No pictures of other

Volkswagen sedans were mixed in with pictures of Appellant's cz:
These poor quality Polaroid pictures depict a beige Volkswagen
with a rip across the entire length of the back seat, and with
no visible rust spots.

At the time she saw these pictures,
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said that the car "resembled" the car she had ridden in when she
was abducted, although the night of her abduction she told police
that all Volkswagens looked alike to her.

(Exhibit 6, page 6)

Later she was taken to see Appellant's car while it was parked
on the street.

At trial she testified that the car she had been

abducted in was beige, that she had never described it as light
blue (R. 420, 421); and that the rip she had seen that night
went all the way across the top of the back seat.

(R. 406)

Thus, her testimony had conformed to the appearance of Appellant's
vehicle.
She said that she could identify Appellant's car from
the pictures because it did not have a front license plate, and
because of the damage depicted on the passenger door.
432, 433)

(R.

407,

However, none of the pictures shown to her reveal the

front of the car, so one cannot determine if there is a license
plate there or not, and none of the pictures shown to her show
visible damage to the passenger door.
i

(R. 433, 434; Exhibit 21)

\fuen asked if the car she had seen in person was the same car she
had been abducted in, she noted that it was completely different,
having a different color, no ripped back seat, and no rust spots.

~

(R. 439)

She might have identified it, however, because the

police were not going to take her to see the wrong car, because
she knew it had been changed, and because the police had told her
that it was the car in the pictures.

(R. 439)

Such are the
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dangers of one car or one man show-ups as mentioned in Simmons
United States, supra. , when the witness may "retain in his
memory the image of the photograph rather than the person actuo.
seen."

~.

390 U.S. at 383-384.

"Subsequent identification c

the accused then shows nothing except that the picture was a
good likeness."

Hammelman & Williams, Identification Parades r:

(1963) Grim. L. Rev., at 448.

DaRonch's identification of

Appellant's car is one influenced profoundly by suggestion.
The State's circumstantial case was at best remote in
probative value.

While Appellant's blood type "0" was the same

type as a small quanti:? of blood found on DaRonch's coat three
days after her abduction, officers, who closely examined her
coat on thenight of her abduction, could find no blood stains,
and DaRonch could not remember scratching the man.

Handcuffs

owned by Appellant were not the same make or model as the
ones which the victim escaped wearing on her arm.

DaRonch neve:

saw the metal instrument held by her abductor, nor did she eve;
testify that the crowbar belonging to Appellant resembled
the metal object she felt that night.

Appellant's ownership

of patent leather shoes was conflicting.
shoes were introduced.

In any event no

sue~

That was the entirety of the circumstar:

tial case against Appellant.

There was no physical evidence

presented and no other eyewitness testimony to corroborate the
Da Ranch identification.

The evidence against Appellant was

thin.
Finally, when considering the amount and character of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Services and
Technology Act,against
administered by the
Utah State Library. it s~ould be
evidence, Library
or lack
thereof,
A?pellant.
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noted that this was a bench trial.
days deliberating the evidence.
as extremely difficult.

Judge Hanson spent three

He characterized his decision

It is apparent that to this judge the

case was closely balanced, and the misconduct which forestalled
effective cross-examination and impeachment of the key prosecution
witness may have tipped the balance beyond a reasonable doubt.
4.
(a)

Summary.
Suppression of evidence affecting credibility of

key prosecution witnesses violates due process, Giglio v. United
States, supra., Napue v. Illinois, supra.
(b)

Carol DaRonch was the sole eyewitness and victim

to her abduction.

Without her testimony, Appellant would not

have been charged or convicted.

A report stating that after

she first saw Appellant's picture, she said she could not identify
her abductor, was suppressed.
(c)

Materiality of suppressed evidence is enhanced

by a verdict of questionable validity.

United States v. Agurs,

supra., Austin v. Wyrick, supra.
(d)

DaRonch's identification testimony is very incon-

sistant and indicative of susceptibility to suggestion, and the
circumstantial evidence introduced is of little value.
(e)

The nature of eyewitness identification testimony

makes effective cross-examination essential.

Norris v. Slayton,

supra., Simmons v. United States, supra., United State v. Wade,
supra.
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(f)

Suppression of Thompson's police report denied

Appellant crucial material to cross-examine Ms. DaRonch and
Thompson on her ability to identify Appellant.
(g)

Appellant need not show that the new evidence would

probably result in acquittal, United States v. Agurs, supra., or
that it would have proved innocence.
(h)

Barbee v. Warden, supra.

Rather, if it might reasonably have overcome or

weakened testimony adverse to Appellant and cause a reasonable
likelihood it could have affected the result, then there has
a constitutional error.

be~

Norris v. Slayton, supra.

The new evidence in this case satisfies the standard of
materiality giving rise to the prosecutorial duty to disclose it.
hence, Appellant's right to due process has been violated.

A

The conviction must be set aside since:
" ... The report might not have been
proof of the defendant's innocence, but if
its contents had been known, it might well
have nurtured, even generated, a reasonable
doubt as to guilt. One cannot possibly say
with any confidence that such a defect in
the trial was harmless. A procedure so
burdened with the tendency to harm accords
a defendant less than due process."
Barbee v. Warden, supra., at 847.

0.

POINT III

d:

THE COURT BELOW APPLIED Al.\1 ERRONEOUS
STANDARD IN DETERdUll~TG THE EFFECT OF
THE NEW EVIDE~KE

ir

The court below found there was no "willful" withholding
of information by either police or prosecution.

The court rulec
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H

it did not believe the inconsistencies between the two reports
1wuld have made any difference in the conduct of the trial.
(R. 1238)

The court ruled that because the new evidence would

not make any difference to the outcome of the trial, the Petition
and Motion of Appellant must be denied.

(R. 1234-1238)

Appellant contends that such a ruling was based upon a
completely erroneous standard of "making any difference" in the
trial outcome.

It does not matter if the new evidence "would

have made a difference" or "affected the outcome" or any such
similar standard.
One of the cases cited by the State in its memorandum

.t.

in Support of Motion to Dismiss (R. 1005) is most helpful to
Appellant on this issue.
427 U.S. 97 (1976).

That case is United States v. Agurs,

In Agurs the defendant was convicted of

second degree murder for the stabbing of a man in a motel room.
Her defense was self-defense.

After trial, her attorney dis-

covered the victim had past convictions for carrying a concealed
'"eapon.

On a motion for a new trial she claimed the evidence, had

it been shown at trial, would have been favorable to her claim
of self defense.
information.

Before trial she made no request for such

The Court, in passing upon the claim, noted three

1istinct types of cases where evidence was known to the prosecution
~t

not the defense.

The first is where the prosecation's case

includes perjured testimony and the prosecution knew, or should
g

ec
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have known of the perjury.

In such a case if the evidence would

"in any reasonable likelihood" affect the verdict, the judgment
must be set aside.

The second type of case was the Brady, supra.

situation, where there is a pretrial request for specific informa·
tion.

In that case, the court said in Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104,

if the suppressed evidence "might have affected the outcome of
the trial" relief is to be granted.

Agurs is often cited for a

"higher" standard of proof for the defense because it involved
the third type of case and a higher standard must be met by the
defense in that t;·;:;e .Jf :::ase.

That is, where there is no request

by defense forany specific type of material, the judgment will no:
be set aside unless the defense can show that the omitted evidenu
resulted in a denial of a fair trial.

427 U.S. at 108.

Thus,

where there is a specific request the defendant does not have to
meet the severe burden of "demonstrating that the newly discovere:
evidence probably would have resulted in acquittal."

427 U.S. a:

111.

Appellant also contends that implicit in Agurs is the
notion that the defense "burden" to show the result of the newly
uncovered evidence is less where the prosecution has "hidden"
the evidence than where the evidence has been discovered from
a neutral source.

Thus, if a piece of physical evidence or a

witness is found after trial by the defense, and the prosecutior.
had no knowledge of it, it may be reasonable to expect the defer.s
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Ld

co show more fully the result that the new evidence may have had
on the verdict.

:a.

:rna·

But, where the prosecution had that evidence, to

require the defense to bear that same burden destroys any incentive
that the prosecutor might have for turning over the evidence to
rhe defense.

If the defense is going to have to "prove" the

effect of the new evidence on the verdict, why give it to him - he
1,ill have a difficult time and the prosecution is not "motivated"
to turn the material over to the defense.

This is the identical

rationale behind the exclusionary rule.
This "Standard of Proof" the defense must bear is clearly

:st

no:

:ncr

very crucial in "new evidence" cases.
an erroneous standard, as it did,

Appellant's motion.
to

For the court below to apply

is to miss the entire thrust of

Appellant submits that to require him to show

that the newly discovered evidence would "have made a different"
in the trial outcome is to require something that the law does

a:

~ot

require and that would be virtually impossible to prove.

If

Appellant shows, and he submits he has, that the evidence "might

ly

~ave"

affected the trial then he has met the requirements of the

law.

Because the court below applied an erroneous standard,

Appellant submits this court should reverse the judgment of the
court below and grant Appellant a new trial.

or.
er.sc
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POINT IV
DISCLOSURE PRIOR TO TRIAL OF DETECTIVE THOMPSON'S
FALSE A..~D MISLEADING REPORT REPRESENTS GOVERNMENTAL
MISCONDUCT, CORRUPTS THE TRUTH-SEEKING FUHCTION OF
A FAIR TRIAL, AND VIOLATES DUE PROCESS.
It has long been recognized that when the State includes
in its case evidence or testimony which it knows or should know
is false, then a violation of due process of law has occurred.
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 79 L.Ed. 791, 44 S.Ct. 340
(1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 87 L.Ed. 214, 63 S. Ct.
177 (1946).

The United States Supreme Court has found error even

j

when the State's complicity was passive, since "(t)he same resul:

h

obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence,
r

allows it to go uncorrected."
405 U.S. at 153.

Giglio v. United States, supra.,

As reflected in Napue v. Illinois, supra.,

the falsehood need not be limited to matters going only to the

a

actual guilt or innocence of the accused:

d

"The principle that a State may not
knowingly use false evidence, including
false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any ordered concept
of liberty, does not cease to apply merely
because the false testimony goes only to
the credibility of the witness."
~.

H

a

360 U.S. at 269.
The purpose of the discussion which follows is to draw

an analogy between the use of false testimony cited above, and,
as in the present case, the State's delivery to the defense of
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o·
t]

a false and misleading police report concerning a critical pretrial identification session involving the State's sole eyewitness.
The released report gave a somewhat favorable and positive
account of the showing by Detective Thompson of Appellant's
picture to Carol DaRonch.

Unfortunately, this witness was unable

to recall during her testimony at the trial just what had trans?ired during the photographic display in question, what she said
at that time, or even if she had picked anyone.

(R. 408-411)

However, she did testify to the effect that she saw Appellant's
en

j

picture on that occasion.

(R. 408)

During the preliminary

1:

hearing she said that upon seeing Appellant's picture her
response was:
(P.H. tr 69)

"These look a lot like him, but I'm not sure."
The impression that she identified Appellant's picture

is subsequently supported by the testimony of the officer who
authored the falsified report, and showed DaRonch the first photo
display containing Appellant's picture, Detective Thompson.
He testified that she pulled Appellant's picture from a stack
and stated, "Yes, I believe that looks a lot like the individual."
(R.

497)

This account is contradicted by, or at least signifi-

cantly modified by Thompson's report suppressed by the State,
but the defense was powerless to effectively impeach Thompson,
or for that matter, DaRonch, without knowledge of evidence of
the prior inconsistant statements contained in the suppressed
'lersion.

-41-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant's position is that Thompson's testimony amounts
to perjury, or a strong inference thereof.

Most blatantly false '

is his testimony that, after what he refers to as a tentative
identification by the eyewitness, DaRonch, he thought he was
"close".

(R. 504)

Because of this he maintained that he was

justified in showing DaRonch a second photograph of Appellant
a few days later.

(R. 504)

The clear inference he makes here

is that DaRonch was a reliable enough witness that she was
either "close" to a positive identification or that he was "close'
to an arrest in the case.

No matter what rationale he uses in

an attempt to legitimize the second display, the suppressed
version of this incident indicates that DaRonch may not have even
tenatively identified Appellant's photo, that Thompson thought
her to be a "very poor witness", that he was looking for witnesse; 1
I

other than DaRonch to view Appellant in a lineup, and that she
did not think she could identify her abductor if she saw him.
These are not the kinds of facts and observations which would
make a man feel "close" to anything.

Thompson's credibility and

DaRonch's reliability as an eyewitness are brought clearly into
question by the suppressed report.
According to United States v. Agurs, supra. , if the undisclosed evidence shows that "the prosecution knew or should have
known of the perjury", then the conviction:
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" ... must be set aside if there is any
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the
jury ... (T)he court has applied a strict
standard of materiality, not just because
they (the false evidence cases) involve
prosecutorial misconduct, but more importantly they involve a corruption of the
truth-seeking function of the fair trial
process."
~.

49 L.Ed. 2d at 349-350.
The Agurs "reasonable likelihood" test was based on similar

tests used in Giglio, supra., and Napue, supra.

It is applicable

to this case because (1) the undisclosed evidence shows Thompson's
and DaRonch's testimony to be false or misleading, and (2) the
delivery of the false report to the defense prior to trial amounts
to the use of false evidence and is a corruption of the truthseeking process .
Perhaps the most insidious effect of this kind of false
evidence shows itself not on the stand directly, but in the manner
in which it blunts and misleads the pretrial preparation of the
defense.

The defense received, prior to trial, a report which

falsely portrays the State's principle witness as having made
an identification of the accused through photographs and that
s·

this same witness was ready, willing and able to identify her
abductor in a lineup.

This witness would not talk to defense

attorneys prior to trial (P.H. tr. 75, 120), which left only
Thompson, the author of both the falsified report and the suppressed
:eport, to verify the accuracy of the falsified report.

This he
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did do on numerous occasions in the courtroom when using the
falsified report to "refresh" his memory on the witness stand.

f

Misled into believing the report, even defense attorneys began tc

T

mouth the words and phrases of falsified statements attributed
to Ms. DaRonch.

Such a deciption is as serious a violation of

t:.,

truthseeking function of the fair trial process as overt perjury
In Napue v. Illinois, supra., the Supreme Court makes
reference to a portion of an opinion in People v. Savvides, 136
N.E.2d 853, 854, 855 (1956):

h

"It is cf no consequence that the
falsehood bore ~con the witness' credibility rather than directly upon the
defendant's guilt. A lie is a lie, no
matter what its subject, and, if it is
in any way relevant to the case, the
district atto1~ey has the responsibility
and duty to correct what he knew to be
false and elicit the truth ... That the
district attorney's silence was not the
result of guile or a desire to prejudice
matters little, for its impact was the
same, preventing as it did, a trial that
could in any real sense be termed fair."

f

a

b

m

Napue v. Illinois, supra., 360 U.S. at 369-370.
The information suppressed by the State is directly relev':
0

to this case and the credibility of its key witnesses.

There is

a reasonable likelihood that the false and misleading report and
testimony based on that report could have influenced the trier
of fact.
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This Court cannot allow to go uncorrected instances where
false and misleading testimony played a key role in the trial.
tc

The conviction must be set aside and a new trial granted.
POINT V

tb

THE IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT WAS THE
RESULT OF UNNECESSARILY SUGGESTIVE PROCEDURES
IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

ry

In Point I of Appellant's original brief and reply brief
he argued that the eyewitness identification procedures were
improper.

(Appellant's Brief 12-20)

Obviously the additional

fact brought out in Appellant's Motion for a New Trial affect the
argument presented there.

Appellant contends that his position

is strengthened on this issue.

The State in its' brief argued

that Appellant was merely setting forth theories and was
bald accusations.

making

Appellant will not here reargue the point

made clear in Point I of the original brief and in this brief
that the witness Carol DaRonch was at first a very unsure witness
who later made a "positive identification" because of the conduct
Ls

of law enforcement personnel set forth in this brief.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that the court below erred
i~

denying Appellant's ~otion for a ~ew Trial or Petition for

Extraordinary Relief, Appellant respectfully submits that the
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order of the Court below should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.

Respectfully Submitted,

JOHN D. O'CONNELL
BRUCE C. LUBECK
Attorneys for Appellant
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